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R.I.P. to RLUIPA: The Ongoing Debate 
of RLUIPA as Applied to Local 
Cemetery Ordinances is Finally Laid 
to Rest 
 
Alexandra C. Rawson* 
“Religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less 
they are mixed together.”-James Madison1 
There is a small farm-town in Massachusetts named “Dudley” 
that is known for its open fields, blossoming trees, and dairy 
farms. In 2016, however, this town that was once known for its 
natural serenity and quaint charm became riddled with heated 
confrontations and allegations. The dispute began in February 
2016, when the Islamic Society of Greater Worcester proposed to 
buy fifty-five acres of farmland for a Muslim cemetery, intended to 
accommodate an estimated 16,000 gravesites.2 The town of 
 
* Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2018; 
B.S., Providence College, 2015. Thank you Professor Jonathan Gutoff, as  
well as alumni, Gregory Henninger and Nicole Matteo, for your invaluable 
assistance throughout the various stages of this Comment. A special thank 
you to the 2017–18 Roger Williams University Law Review. I would also like 
to express my gratitude to my parents, James and Cynthia Rawson. Without 
your constant guidance and support, this would not be possible. Finally, 
thank you to Adam Fraser for all your love, support, and patience throughout 
the writing process. I could not have done this without you. 
1. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, 10 July 1822, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02- 
02-0471 (last updated June 29, 2017). 
2. Brian MacQuarrie, Muslims face backlash over proposed cemetery in 
Dudley, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/ 
2016/03/28/muslims-face-backlash-over-proposed-cemetery-dudley/awhGJrYq 
60mZGoDEbFWDJP/story.html; see also Kim Ring, Islamic cemetery plan 
meets opposition at Dudley hearing, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Feb. 
6, 2016), http://www.telegram.com/article/20160204/NEWS/160209543. 
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Dudley originally rejected the proposal citing well-water 
contamination, zoning issues, and increased traffic concerns.3 
Nevertheless, this was not the end of the struggle. In just a few 
months, Dudley was sued by the Islamic Society and was under 
federal investigation by the United States Attorney’s Office based 
on allegations that Dudley’s actions were discriminatory and 
violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA).4 In December 2016, after many months of heated 
contention, Dudley succumbed to the pressure and approved the 
cemetery permit.5 
Interestingly, Dudley, Massachusetts, has not been the only 
town confronted with a RLUIPA challenge due to a religious 
institution’s request for a cemetery permit. Other municipalities 
have similarly experienced intense disputes concerning this very 
topic. For example, in Farmington, Minnesota, the Castle Rock 
Township originally denied a cemetery permit to the Al Maghfirah 
Cemetery Association based on the township’s concern that the 
cemetery would decrease property tax revenue and require 
additional maintenance expenses.6 After the township’s planning 
commission amended the zoning ordinances to exclude cemeteries 
within that area, the Al Maghfirah Cemetery Association filed a 
 
 
3. Brian MacQuarrie, Islamic group accuses Dudley of blocking Muslim 
cemetery, BOS.   GLOBE (July 5, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
metro/2016/07/05/islamic-group-files-suit-accusing-dudley-illegally-blocking- 
muslim-cemetery-plans/9TpLhOUWs8S3z2QoGmHPbM/story.html. 
4. U.S. Attorney Ortiz to Probe Islamic Cemetery Proposal in Dudley, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. ATT’YS OFF., DIST. OF MASS., https://www.justice.gov/ 
usao-ma/pr/us-attorney-ortiz-probe-islamic-cemetery-proposal-dudley (last 
updated Aug. 18, 2016). 
5. Mark Arsenault, Town of Dudley reaches settlement over proposed 
Muslim cemetery, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
2016/12/23/dudley/FwDOBliIw8MzsgNtoTWa9O/story.html. Nevertheless, in 
just a few months of gaining approval for the cemetery, the Association 
decided that it no longer wanted to use Dudley, Massachusetts, as the 
location for its cemetery after all. Brian MacQuarrie, After bitter fight for 
approval, Islamic Society abruptly drops plan for cemetery in town of Dudley, 
BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/ 
2017/04/13/after-bitter-fight-for-approval-islamic-society-abruptly-drops-plan- 
for-cemetery-town-dudley/JZ7H61XR2fxMc88AcZp6ZN/story.html. 
6. Tory Cooney, Judge OKs Muslim cemetery in Castle Rock Township, 
FARMINGTON INDEP. (Feb. 11, 2016, 6:14 AM), 
http://www.farmingtonindependent.com/life/religion/3945067-judge-oks- 
muslim-cemetery-castle-rock-township. 
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lawsuit in the County District Court.7 The Association also 
allegedly requested that the Department of Justice investigate 
whether the allegedly discriminatory ordinances violated 
RLUIPA.8 The district judge found that the permit denial was 
“arbitrary and capricious” and quickly overturned it.9 Pursuant to 
court orders, the Township granted the permit.10 Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, fell into a similar controversy when the West 
Pennsboro Township Board rejected the Bosniak Islamic Cultural 
Center of Carlisle’s cemetery proposal, based on its concerns about 
water contamination and decreased property values.11  However,  
a judge quickly overturned the town’s ruling and granted the 
cemetery’s proposal.12 
Similarly, in Nassau County, New York, there has been a 
longstanding dispute between The Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Rockville Centre, New York, and the governing and legislative 
figures in the community regarding the Diocese’s application to 
develop a cemetery, the “Queen of Peace Cemetery,” on 
approximately ninety-seven acres of land.13 After the Village 
denied the cemetery proposal, the Diocese brought an action 
against the Village, alleging, among other things, that the zoning 
laws violated RLUIPA.14 On the summary judgment motion, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
 
 
7. Mukhtar Ibrahim, Castle Rock Township must allow Islamic 
cemetery, judge rules, MPRNEWS (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.mprnews.org/ 
story/2016/02/01/dakota-county-ruling-islamic-cemetery-muslim-religious- 
discrimination. 
8. Cooney, supra note 6. 
9. Ibrahim, supra note 7. 
10. Id. Although Minnesota already had two Islamic cemeteries, they 
neared capacity; thus, the Association planned to use the 20-acre site for an 
estimated 35,000 burials, thereby accommodating its needs for the next 200 
years. 
11. Daniel Walmer, West Pennsboro Township officials vote down 
Bosniak cemetery, THE SENTINEL (Mar. 23, 2015), http://cumberlink.com/ 
news/local/west-pennsboro-township-officials-vote-down-bosniak-cemetery/ 
article_c8586d8b-3f64-50ad-bd1a-420fb804a275.html; Elise Amendola, Plans 
for Muslim cemeteries face backlash across the U.S., CBS NEWS (Apr. 25, 
2016, 9:13 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/plans-for-muslim-cemeteries- 
face-backlash-across-the-us/. 
12. Amendola, supra note 11. 
13. Roman Cath. Diocese of Rockville Ctr., N.Y. v. Inc. Vill. of Old 
Westbury, 128 F. Supp. 3d 566, 571, 573 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
14. Id. at 571, 573. 
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held that although the zoning law was neutral with respect to 
religion and was generally applicable, a “genuine issue of material 
facts existed as to whether [the] zoning law created substantial 
burden on the exercise of [the] religious corporation’s religious 
beliefs” and as to whether the Village used the “least restrictive 
means” to protect its interests in maintaining the aesthetic 
qualities of the Village.15 
In 2012, the construction of an ohel, which is a “stand-alone 
structure customarily built over the graves of righteous scholars 
and leaders of the Hassidic Jewish community,” raised debates in 
Hempstead, New York.16 Here, the town subsequently rejected  
the building permit application for the ohel because the applicants 
never obtained the Cemetery’s signature for the application as 
was required under the town building code.17 In response, the 
applicants brought suit against the town, alleging that the denial 
violated their rights under the First Amendment and RLUIPA.18 
The court, however, dismissed the case based on its finding that 
the claims were not ripe, and should have first been appealed to 
the zoning board of appeals.19 
News reports covering these stories often highlighted some 
form of bigotry or prejudice imposed by the municipalities.20 
Although in some instances evidence of bias manifested,21 this did 
not depict the entire story. Rather, the reports often forgot to 
mention two big features: the municipality’s perspective,22 and 
 
15. Id. at 567, 583–84, 586–87. 
16. Twersky v. Town of Hempstead, No. 10 CV 4573 MKB, slip op. at 2 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012). 
17. Id. at 3. 
18. Id. at 4. 
19. Id. at 7. 
20. Plans for Muslim cemeteries across US met with worry, 
disappointment, FOX NEWS (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
us/2016/04/27/plans-for-muslim-cemeteries-across-us-met-with-worry- 
disappointment.html. 
21. In another municipality, perhaps met with the greatest backlash, 
including threats, an estimated 3,000 residents spoke out against a proposed 
Muslim cemetery. Collin County Residents Condemn Proposal For Muslim 
Cemetery, CBS DFW (July 14, 2015, 8:27 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/ 
2015/07/14/collin-county-residents-condemn-proposal-for-muslim-cemetery/. 
22. Boston Globe Forgot To Mention That Dudley Doesn’t Want A Muslim 
Cemetery Because It Will Affect The Water, And Now SJW’s Are Calling The 
Entire Town Islamophobic And Bigoted, TURTLEBOY, http://turtleboysports.co/ 
boston-globe-forgot-to-mention-that-dudley-doesnt-want-a-muslim-cemetery- 
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most importantly, the role that RLUIPA, a congressional act 
designed to eliminate governmental regulations from restricting 
the exercise of religion, played in these recent debates.23 Today, 
many Americans remain unaware of RLUIPA’s expansive nature, 
despite the harrowing implications that the wide-ranging Act 
imposes upon American society.24 
In 2000, Congress enacted RLUIPA to protect individuals, as 
well as religious assemblies and institutions, from land use 
regulations that substantially burdened the exercise of religious 
practices.25 In doing so, Congress provided special protections to 
individuals, religious institutions, and other religious assemblies’ 
religious exercises that were not made available to ordinary 
citizens. As RLUIPA stands, if a local government imposes a 
burden upon the religious exercise of individuals, religious 
assemblies, or institutions, the government must prove that its 
action was in the furtherance of a “compelling governmental 
interest” and that its interest cannot be achieved through less 
restrictive means.26 
Although this Comment highlights the challenges that local 
governments experience as a result of RLUIPA’s regulation over 
cemeteries, cemeteries are just one example of this recent 
phenomenon. RLUIPA broadly protects individuals, houses of 
worship, and other religious institutions from substantially 
burdensome zoning and landmark laws.27 Nevertheless, as the 
 
because-it-will-affect-the-water-and-now-sjws-are-calling-the-entire-town- 
islamophobic-and-bigoted/ (last updated Jan. 8, 2017). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
24. Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. C.R. 
Div., to State, County, and Municipal Officials, Dec. 15, 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/918596/ [hereinafter Letter from 
Vanita Gupta] (stating that “sixteen years after RLUIPA’s enactment, far too 
many people and communities remain unaware of the law, or do not fully 
understand the scope of its provisions”). 
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Also note, RLUIPA includes provisions to 
protect institutionalized persons from prison protocols that place a 
substantial burden on the exercise of religion. See id. § 2000cc-1. 
26. See id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, https://www.justice.gov/crt/religious-land-use- 
and-institutionalized-persons-act (last updated Jan. 11, 2017); see also 
Lubavitch v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 
2014) (Defendant, a religious corporation, alleged that the Historic District 
Commission’s denial of its proposed modifications, which included: “a 17,000- 
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nation continues to diversify and expand, this raises the question 
as to how far this Act can stretch.28 There is only so much land 
and there are many competing desires for it.29 As such, a town’s 
perspective deserves due consideration and discussion. 
Part I of this Comment begins with the backdrop of RLUIPA 
by briefly presenting the contentions surrounding the varying 
levels of scrutiny that have been applied to religious exercise, 
which eventually led to the enactment of RLUIPA. Part II argues 
that RLUIPA is unconstitutional as applied to local ordinances 
regulating cemeteries. Conversely, Part III argues that even if 
RLUIPA is not unconstitutional, cemetery regulations satisfy 
RLUIPA in that: (A) cemeteries are not a religious land use; and 
(B) cemetery regulations are justified by compelling interests. 
Lastly, Part IV provides recommendations and alternatives that 
could be adopted to strike a fairer balance between the Act and 
local governments. 
I. THE TURN OF EVENTS LEADING TO RLUIPA’S ENACTMENT 
The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .”30 While the government is normally 
prohibited from regulating religion, the Supreme Court has held 
that freedom of religion does not mean that all religious practices 
are unrestricted.31 Rather, in some circumstances, legislative 
 
square-foot addition to be built . . . administrative offices, classrooms, a 
nearly 5,000-square-foot residence for [the Rabbi] and his family, an indoor 
swimming pool, guest accommodations, kitchens, and a ritual bath,” violated 
RLUIPA and state law.). 
28. See Emp’t. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 
(1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (noting that, “because ‘we are a 
cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious 
preference,’ and . . . because we value and protect that religious divergence, 
we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid . . . every 
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order” 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). 
29. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 
(1988) (explaining that “[t]he Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer 
to reconcile the various competing demands on government, many of them 
rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society 
as ours”). 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
31. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (noting that 
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action is required to maintain an organized and peaceful society.32 
As such, the circumstances in which legislative action can restrict 
religious exercise has sparked a contentious debate between the 
judicial and legislative branches. This contention is depicted by 
the fluctuating levels of scrutiny that have been applied by the 
courts in the context of religious exercise, which eventually led to 
the enactment of RLUIPA. 
For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, a claimant asserted that 
disqualifying her from unemployment benefits because she 
refused to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath day, violated her First 
Amendment right.33 The Court, ruling in her favor, held that the 
state’s benefit provision unconstitutionally forced recipients to 
reject their religious beliefs to obtain public benefits.34 Most 
important, however, was the level of scrutiny that the Court 
applied when determining whether to uphold the state’s 
restrictive provisions. The Court held that “any incidental  
burden” on the exercise of religion is warranted only when the 
government can show that the regulation is “justified by a 
‘compelling state interest.’”35 Subsequent cases affirmed this 
standard. 
However, although Sherbert applied strict scrutiny, 
subsequent case law was somewhat unclear in determining 
whether this standard should apply to incidental burdens. For 
example, in 1990, the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith, unlike the prior cases, rejected strict scrutiny 
for laws that impose incidental burdens.36 In that case, claimants 
asserted that Oregon unconstitutionally denied them 
unemployment benefits because they ingested peyote, an illegal 
substance, during a Native American religious ceremony.37 The 
Court held that because it was against state law to ingest peyote, 
it did not matter whether the claimants ingested the peyote for 
 
“[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices”). 
32. See id. at 166–67. 
33. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
34. Id. at 410. 
35. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
36. See Emp’t. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 
(1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488. 
37. Id. at 872. 
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religious purposes; thus, the State was perfectly warranted to 
deny the claimants unemployment benefits.38 Notably, the Court 
refused to apply the heightened standard of scrutiny that previous 
courts, such as Sherbert, had relied upon. Instead, the Court 
applied a lower level of scrutiny based on its reasoning that “the 
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general 
applicability.’”39 
In 1993, dismayed by the Smith decision and its application of 
“neutral laws of general applicability” in this context, Congress 
reacted by passing the “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” 
(RFRA).40 Under RFRA, Congress attempted to bring back strict 
scrutiny by requiring States to establish a “compelling interest” to 
justify an infringement upon religious exercise.41 However, in 
1997, the Supreme Court struck back in City of Boerne v. Flores, 
by holding RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states for its 
“considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional 
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and 
welfare of their citizens.”42  However, it did not take Congress  
long to devise a new plan. 
In 1998, Congress introduced the Religious Liberty Protection 
Act (RLPA), which again imposed the strict scrutiny test, but, 
unlike RFRA, included a congressional power hook through the 
Commerce Clause.43 However, RLPA failed due to the strong 
opposition that civil rights activists, child advocates, and 
federalist organizations presented during Congressional hearings. 
 
38. Id. at 890; see also id. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an 
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”). 
39. Id. at 879 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
40. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
42. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). 
43. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True 
Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 
IND. L.J. 311, 334 (2003) [hereinafter Federalism and the Public Good] (“To 
Congress’s credit, it remembered with RLPA the warning in United States v. 
Lopez to analyze the constitutional bases of its actions.”); see also Religious 
Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4019 In House, 105th Cong. 
27 (1998); Issues Relating to Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the 
Constitutionality of a Religious Protection Measure: S. Hrg. 106–689 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter S. Hrg. 106– 
689]. 
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Nevertheless, a coalition of religious and civil liberties groups 
continued to support a limited version of the RLPA bill that would 
provide these same protections to religious practices. However,  
the bill’s application would be limited to two contexts: (1) land use 
regulations and (2) prison protocols. So, without holding any 
additional hearings,44 Congress transformed RLPA into the 
“Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act” 
(RLUIPA).45 Thus, although RLUIPA, like RLPA, is focused on 
“protect[ing] religious liberty from unnecessary governmental 
interference,” RLUIPA is essentially the “narrowly focused” 
version of RLPA.46 
As such, RLUIPA’s protections are limited to two contexts: (1) 
“where State and local governments seek to impose or implement 
a zoning or landmark law in a manner that imposes a substantial 
burden on religious exercise” and (2) “where State and local 
governments seek to impose a substantial burden on the religious 
exercise of persons residing or confined to certain institutions.”47 
In short, RLUIPA’s land use provision is understood to “provide 
protection for houses of worship and other religious assemblies 
from restrictive land use regulation that often prevents the 
practice of faith.”48 For this reason, RLUIPA applies a strict 
scrutiny standard in cases where land is regulated, receives 
federal funds, or affects commerce. As such, “if a zoning or 
landmarking law substantially burdens a person’s free exercise of 
 
 
44. See Hamilton, supra note 43, at 334 (noting that no hearings were 
held on RLUIPA; instead, the RLPA hearings that generally addressed land 
use law stood in as hearings in support of RLUIPA). 
45. See id. at 334–35; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. 
46. See 146 CONG. REC. S6678-02 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of 
Rep. Hatch). RLUIPA states in relevant parts that: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise 
of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the 
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 
person, assembly, or institution—(A) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
47. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, 662 (2000). 
48. 146 CONG. REC. S6678-02 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Rep. 
Hatch). 
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religion, the government involved must demonstrate that the 
particular law is the least restrictive means of furthering a 
compelling governmental interest.”49 
II. RLUIPA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO LOCAL ORDINANCES 
REGULATING CEMETERIES BECAUSE IT OVER EXTENDS CONGRESS’S 
ENUMERATED POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE50 
Despite Congress’s intentions, RLUIPA is unconstitutional as 
applied to local ordinances regulating cemeteries because it goes 
well beyond Congress’s enumerated powers through the 
Commerce Clause.51 Thus, in this limited context, the Act is 
arguably unconstitutional. 
To maintain an equilibrium of power among the three 
branches, the framers imposed inherent restrictions upon the 
authority of each branch. As such, the legislative branch, 
entrusted with the power to enact law, may only do so when it has 
express or implied constitutional power.52 One of those powers is 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.53 This includes 
the power to regulate channels, instrumentalities, and economic 
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.54 
 
49. Id. (statement of Rep. Enzi). 
50. This Comment will not discuss the possibility of the Act as applied to 
the Spending Clause. However, the Author does acknowledge that this is a 
potential argument to be made. 
51. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R.1691 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. 1 (2000) [hereinafter H.R. 1691 Hearing] (testimony and prepared 
statement of Lawrence G. Sager, Robert B. McKay, Prof. of L., N.Y.U. School 
of Law) (“RLPA . . . extends liberty selectively and makes recognizable 
religious motivation a talisman of advantage. That is a flat contradiction of 
religious liberty at its essence, and the Supreme Court would say so pursuant 
to the Establishment Clause of the first amendment.”). 
52. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (stating that “[t]he 
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may 
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written”); see also United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (noting, “[e]very law enacted by 
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the 
Constitution”). 
53. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189–90 (1824) (“Commerce, 
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It  
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, 
in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that 
intercourse.”). 
54. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
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It was through this clause that Congress enacted RLUIPA.55 
However, the Commerce Clause is inapplicable to RLUIPA when 
applied to ordinances regulating cemeteries because the clause 
was designed to promote a national market by terminating hostile 
trade regulations and protective tariffs that restricted free-flowing 
trade among the States.56 Cemeteries are a far cry from economic 
activities of interstate trade to warrant regulation under the 
Commerce Clause. 
First and foremost, the use of land for a cemetery does not 
constitute an economic activity. In Gonzalez v. Raich, which 
concerned the possession of homegrown marijuana for medical 
purposes, the Supreme Court concluded that because the medical 
marijuana was for personal consumption, and thus, was not sold, 
the possession alone did not constitute an economic activity.57 
Thus, although homegrown marijuana presumably relied on 
essential economic transactions, such as planting materials and 
heating devices, the actual possession of marijuana, which is what 
Congress sought to regulate, was not an economic activity.58 
In accordance with Raich, Congress’s regulation of cemeteries 
under RLUIPA should be deemed unconstitutional. Under 
RLUIPA, Congress attempts to regulate religious land use, 
whereas in Raich, Congress sought to regulate medical marijuana; 
however, the actual marijuana was not intended for sale, and 
thus, was not considered an economic activity.59 Similarly, with 
cemeteries, Congress cannot rely on the Commerce Clause to 
regulate the use of land for cemeteries because, like the marijuana 
in Raich, the cemetery land is not going to be sold.60 Rather, the 
very point of a cemetery is to keep the land so that the bodies laid 
 
 
55. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (“[T]he bill 
applies only to the extent that Congress has power to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, or Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . The jurisdictional element in this bill is that, in each case, 
the burden on religious exercise, or removal of that burden, will affect 
interstate commerce.”). 
56. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436–37 (1980) (noting that 
“the Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory 
measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace”). 
57.    545 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2005). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See id. 
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to rest are not disturbed. Thus, the possession of land for a 
cemetery, like medical marijuana possession for personal 
consumption, is not a commodity that is sold or part of an ongoing 
market.61 For this reason, the onetime purchase of the land is the 
extent to which economic transactions are involved in cemeteries. 
So, although Congress could regulate the initial sale of the land as 
interstate commerce, Congress cannot regulate whether the land 
is used as a cemetery because the actual use of the land for a 
cemetery does not constitute an economic activity.62 Thus, to the 
extent that Congress would argue that RLUIPA applies to 
cemeteries, this argument fails because, given that use of land for 
a cemetery is not an economic activity, Congress could not rely 
upon the Commerce Clause to regulate such use.63 
Nevertheless, Raich carved out an exception for such “non- 
economic” activities.64 The Court reasoned that the possession of 
marijuana, although intended for home consumption, fell within 
the commerce power because the regulation of marijuana 
possession was necessary to fulfill a larger regulatory scheme: the 
federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA).65 This is where RLUIPA 
departs from the situation presented in Raich. 
In order to effectuate the CSA, a comprehensive Act that 
regulates the complicated realm of controlled substances, 
Congress necessarily had to regulate homegrown marijuana as 
well. As the Court explained, “[g]iven the enforcement difficulties 
that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally 
and marijuana grown elsewhere, . . . and concerns about diversion 
into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that 
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate 
the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would 
leave a gaping hole in the CSA.”66 As such, given that demands  
for marijuana have a strong likelihood of drawing homegrown 
medical marijuana into interstate markets, “Congress acted 
rationally in determining that . . . the subdivided class of  
activities . . . was an essential part of the larger regulatory 
 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 22. 
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scheme.”67 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. McCalla held 
that the application of a federal statute that criminalized the 
production and possession of child pornography was not 
unconstitutional because the statute, as a part of a national effort 
to eliminate the child pornography industry, was a valid exercise 
of Congressional authority under the Commerce  Clause.68  
Relying on similar arguments raised in Raich, the court reasoned 
that the statute “[wa]s comprehensive in that it [sought] to 
regulate (more accurately, exterminate) the entire child 
pornography market (similar to at least one category of the CSA— 
marijuana).”69 Drawing another comparison to the CSA’s 
complexity, the court also noted that child pornography “[has] 
become [a] highly organized, multimillion dollar industr[y] that 
operate[s] on a nationwide scale.”70 Furthermore, quoting the 
Fourth Circuit, the court emphasized that “[j]ust as Congress 
rationally concluded that demand might draw homegrown 
marijuana into interstate markets, thereby frustrating the federal 
interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate 
market in their entirety, so too might Congress rationally fear 
that homemade child pornography would find its way into 
interstate commerce.”71 
RLUIPA is highly distinguishable from both Raich and 
McCalla, and thus, cannot be deemed a compressive regulatory 
scheme that warrants congressional regulation under the 
Commerce Clause. To begin, RLUIPA cannot be deemed a 
“comprehensive regulatory scheme” because RLUIPA, which aims 
to protect religious organizations in their religious land uses, is 
not as complex or expansive as the CSA or the federal child 
pornography statute. Rather, unlike the statutes in Raich and 
McCalla, which aim to eliminate multifaceted criminal schemes, 
RLUIPA does not have to eliminate any and all land use 
regulations to achieve its purpose. Thus, unlike the above- 
mentioned statutes, under RLUIPA, exceptions for certain land 
 
67. Id. at 26–27. 
68. 545 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 2008). 
69. Id. at 755. 
70. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
71. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 
78 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
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uses could exist, and the statute would still maintain its 
effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, even if RLUIPA were deemed a large regulatory 
scheme, the use of land for cemeteries, is not a class of activities 
that is essential to the Act’s success. In Gonzalez, the Court 
reasoned that for Congress to effectively control marijuana 
consumption, it necessarily had to regulate medical marijuana 
consumption as well. Similarly, in McCalla, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that, for Congress to eliminate child pornography, it 
unavoidably had to eliminate homegrown child pornography. 
However, for RLUIPA to effectively regulate land use ordinances, 
Congress does not necessarily have to regulate local cemetery 
ordinances for RLUIPA to function successfully. Considering the 
unique circumstances posed by cemeteries, local cemetery 
ordinances could receive exemption from RLUIPA, and yet, 
Congress could continue to regulate restrictive land use 
regulations in other contexts. Thus, Congress’s conclusion that, 
even if the use of land for a cemetery is deemed a non-economic 
activity, failure to regulate cemeteries wound leave a “gaping 
hole” in RLUIPA is ungrounded because the success of RLUIPA is 
not contingent upon whether cemetery ordinances are a part of 
the regulatory scheme.72 
Moreover, cemetery ordinances cannot be deemed as having a 
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce. In 1995, United  
States v. Lopez clarified what it meant for an economic activity to 
have a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce to warrant 
Congressional regulation.73  The Court held that, although guns  
in a school zone may adversely affect the economy, the mere 
possession of a gun was “in no sense an economic activity.”74 As 
the Court noted, the gun possession statute “by its terms ha[d] 
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, 
however broadly one might [have] define[d] those terms.”75 For 
this reason, the Court held that, despite valid concerns that gun 
 
72. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); see also United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (noting that the gun possession in a school 
zone statute “[wa]s not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated”). 
73. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60. 
74. Id. at 561. 
75. Id. 
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possession in school zones could promote violence, and thus, 
negatively impact the surrounding economy, the criminal statute 
itself had nothing to do with the regulation of commerce.76 Thus, 
the statute could not be “sustained under [its] cases upholding 
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a 
commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.”77 With this holding, 
the Court articulated a bright-line standard that, aside from 
channels or instrumentalities: Congress can only regulate 
economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.78 
RLUIPA, applied to cemetery ordinances, does not pass the 
standard set forth by Lopez, because, in this context, Congress is 
not regulating an economic activity. As such, the  cumulative 
effect of restrictive cemetery ordinances cannot be used to 
transform this non-economic activity into an economic one for 
purposes of obtaining Commerce Clause authority. Just as the 
statute regarding gun possession in a school zone did not 
constitute an economic activity, as previously discussed, the use of 
land for cemeteries does not constitute an economic activity. 
Moreover, just as the adverse effects of gun possession in school 
zones could not be relied upon to constitute a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, the adverse effects of cemetery ordinances 
cannot be relied upon to constitute a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. Under RLUIPA, Congress asserts that 
religious land use falls within the Commerce Clause power 
because “the burden on religious exercise, or removal of that 
burden, will affect interstate commerce.”79 Congress argued that 
restrictive land use regulations limit “economic transactions in 
commerce, such as a construction project, purchase or rental of a 
building, or an interstate shipment of religious goods,” the 
aggregate effect of which, “is obviously substantial.”80 However, 
 
76. See id. at 563–64, 567. 
77. Id. at 561. 
78. Id. at 559 (“We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case 
law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated 
activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”). 
79. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). 
80. Id.; see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 
520 U.S. 564, 573, 595 (1997) (holding that the aggregate effect of restricting 
the religious practice equated to a substantial burden on interstate 
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Congress’s argument is unsubstantiated because, in failing to 
establish that religious land use is an actual economic activity, 
Congress points only to the cumulative effects that restrictive land 
use regulations could potentially have on commerce.81 Recall, this 
is the very reason Lopez fell outside of the Commerce Clause, 
because, although possession of guns in school zones could 
threaten the learning environment or lead to increased crime, the 
actual act of possessing a gun was not an economic activity.82  
That is the same exact situation at play here.83 Although  
cemetery ordinances may decrease construction project demands, 
the actual act of religious land use is not economic in nature; 
rather, it is the effects alone that portray its economic 
characteristic.84 Thus, given that Congress can only regulate 
economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, any aggregate effects that cemetery ordinances pose 
are erroneous because cumulative effects can only constitute 
substantial activity if the underlying activity Congress seeks to 
regulate is an economic activity, and here, that is not the case. 
Similarly, in United States v. Morrison, the Court held that 
 
commerce). 
81. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000); see also H.R. 
1691 Hearing, supra note 51, at 14 (statement of Lawrence G. Sager & Robert 
B. McKay) (“No one believes that RLPA is addressed to increasing interstate 
commerce, to the control of interstate commerce, or to the benefit of the 
economy generally. RLPA seizes on the entirely coincidental fact that some 
laws which regulate religiously motivated conduct will thereby have some 
effect on interstate commerce in order to find a commerce clause rationale for 
the blanket exemption from the force of such laws that it grants religiously- 
motivated persons. This flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).”). 
82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. 
83. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850–51 (2000) (holding that 
“an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not 
qualify as property ‘used in’ commerce or commerce-affecting activity”). 
84. H.R. 1691 Hearing, supra note 51, at 19 (statement of Lawrence G. 
Sager & Robert B. McKay) (“RLPA is a far more extreme example of what 
worried the Court in Lopez. RLPA does not emerge from or reflect any honest 
concern with interstate commerce. Congress’ purpose is not, for example, to 
encourage churches and religious persons to participate more extensively in 
interstate commerce. . . . The connection between religious activity and 
commerce is being used as a constitutional excuse for a regulatory program 
which Congress wishes to enact for reasons having nothing at all to do with 
commerce. The nexus between RLPA and legitimate Commerce Clause goals 
is thus weaker than the nexus between the Gun Free School Zones Act and 
legitimate Commerce Clause goals.”). 
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Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
gender motivated crimes of violence because, as the Court 
reasoned, such acts “are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity.”85 Congress tried to argue that  gender-motivated 
violence affects interstate commerce “by deterring potential 
victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in 
interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in 
places involved in interstate commerce; . . . by diminishing 
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and 
decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate 
products.”86 Nevertheless, the Court explained that Congress 
could not rely on “but for” causation “from the initial occurrence of 
violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon interstate 
commerce,”87 because, if accepted, this would “allow Congress to 
regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact 
of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, 
transit, or consumption.”88 Accordingly, the Court “reject[ed] the 
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent 
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce.”89 
Thus, although it is conceded that cemeteries require 
underlying economic transactions to effectuate their means, as 
explained in Morrison, Congress cannot aggregate the effects of a 
non-economic activity to obtain Commerce Clause authority. In 
Morrison, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that gender- 
motivated crimes fell within Congress’s Commerce Clause power 
because the aggregate effect, which included the impact on 
employment and the supply and demand for interstate products, 
effected interstate commerce. Similarly, although cemeteries 
would necessarily require building materials, as well as 
construction and maintenance contracts, Congress cannot rely on 
a “but for” causation chain of events from every cemetery permit 
rejection to every attenuated effect on interstate commerce. As 
such, Congress’s attempts to merely aggregate the effects of 
cemetery ordinances, which are non-economic activities, should 
 
85. 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
86. Id. at 615 (citation omitted). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 617. 
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not suffice as a mechanism for Congress to gain regulatory power 
under the Commerce Clause. 
Nevertheless, Congress cleverly found a way to circumvent 
the above-mentioned challenges. To bypass the Commerce 
Clause’s inherently limited application, Congress evaded the 
challenges raised in Lopez and Morrison by including a 
jurisdictional hook in the Act’s language. This hook states that  
the “scope” of the Act covers regulations where “the substantial 
burden affects, or the removal of that substantial burden would 
affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, 
or with Indian tribes,” “even if the burden result[ed] from a rule of 
general applicability.”90 
Regardless, there is still hope for cemetery ordinances. 
Recently, in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, the Supreme Court held that the individual health 
insurance mandate of the Affordable Care Act was not within 
Congress’s Commerce power because, as set forth by Lopez and 
Gonzalez, absent an economic activity, there is nothing for 
Congress to regulate.91 The Court stated that holding otherwise 
would “erode [Congress’s] limits, permitting Congress to reach 
beyond the natural extent of its authority, ‘everywhere extending 
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex.’”92 Sebelius is pertinent here because of the message it 
sent. Through this decision, the Court reinforced the fundamental 
concept that the Commerce Clause has limits.93 Given the 
Supreme Court’s recent curtailment of Congress’s assumedly 
omnipotent Commerce Clause power, this presents the perfect 
opportunity for courts interpreting RLUIPA’s land use provision  
to similarly adopt a strict interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
power and find that it does not extend to cemeteries. 
Thus, the Commerce Clause is inapplicable to RLUIPA when 
applied to local ordinances regulating cemeteries because using 
land for burials is not economic in nature. For this reason, the 
courts should take a more stringent look at the Framer’s intent, 
and not condone overarching regulations that obliterate the true 
 
 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), (b)(2) (2012). 
91. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012). 
92. Id. (citations omitted). 
93. Id. 
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intent of the Commerce Clause.94 
III. EVEN IF RLUIPA IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO LOCAL 
ORDINANCES REGULATING CEMETERIES, CEMETERY REGULATIONS DO 
NOT SATISFY RLUIPA IN THAT CEMETERIES ARE NOT A RELIGIOUS LAND 
USE AND CEMETERY REGULATIONS ARE JUSTIFIED BY COMPELLING 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS 
As a practical matter, the actual application of RLUIPA has 
raised many issues within local governments and communities, 
which has, in effect, led to hostility and confrontation between 
local officials and religious institutions. Ultimately, the problems 
surrounding RLUIPA stem from Congress’s attempt to cast such a 
broad shield over all “religious exercise” combined with Congress’s 
failure to account for the intricacies that certain property uses 
encompass.95 In doing so, Congress failed to give sufficient 
consideration to the adverse effects that RLUIPA’s broad and 
overreaching restrictions would pose for local communities, and 
instead, placed tight restraints upon local government to abide by 
this heightened scrutiny. Given the expansive application of 
RLUIPA’s religious exercise definition, religious land use has 
come to incorporate a wide range of institutions, including: 
churches, mosques, temples, schools, community centers, 
cemeteries, hospitals, etc. As such, cemeteries are just one 
example to illustrate how misguided RLUIPA’s application has 
proven to be as a result of Congress’s inadvertence. In the context 
of cemeteries alone, this has raised the questions: What should 
constitute “religious” land use? And in this particular context, 
what should be considered compelling interests? 
 
94. See H.R. 1691 Hearing, supra note 51 at 20 (statement of Lawrence 
G. Sager & Robert B. McKay) (warning that “[i]t would be a mistake to think 
that boilerplate references to commerce give Congress a free hand to regulate 
can save an otherwise unconstitutional statute”). 
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7). This section provides: 
(A) In general. The term “religious exercise” includes any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief. 
(B) Rule. The use, building, or conversion of real property for the 
purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious 
exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the 
property for that purpose. 
Id. 
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A. Cemeteries should NOT constitute “religious” land use96 
In accordance with RLUIPA, “‘religious exercise’ includes any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief,” which also includes “[t]he use, building, 
or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise.”97 In response to the expansiveness of RLUIPA’s reach, 
the courts have “caution[ed] that RLUIPA cannot be so broad as to 
protect any construction plan merely because an institution 
pursues a religious mission.”98 As the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut duly noted, these land use provisions “are in contrast 
to existing first amendment jurisprudence, which holds that 
‘building and owning a church is a desirable accessory of worship, 
not a fundamental tenet of the [c]ongregation’s religious beliefs’ 
and, therefore, do not constitute the exercise of religion within the 
meaning of the free exercise clause.”99 In furtherance of this 
principle, despite RLUIPA’s broad definition and inherent attempt 
to cover any activity affiliated with a religious entity, cemeteries 
should not be deemed a “religious exercise” because  merely 
owning or using a plot of land by itself should not constitute a 
religious exercise. 
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, faced with the 
question of whether or not a religious society was entitled to use a 
particular plot of land for a cemetery, began its analysis by 
pointing out that the area for the cemetery was “zoned primarily 
for agricultural and residential uses.”100 The court hypothesized, 
“[i]f a business corporation had purchased the eighty-eight acres 
in question for use as a cemetery and as a business venture for 
profit, there would be no question but that it was not a religious 
 
 
96. Although I am taking the position that cemeteries should not 
constitute religious land use, another law review article came to the opposite 
conclusion. See Rachel Scall, Note, Bring Out Your Dead: An Examination of 
the Possibilities for Zoning Out Cemeteries Under RLUIPA, 24 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 111, 119 (2016). 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)–(B). 
98. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 
543 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007). 
99. Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n of Newtown, 285 Conn. 381, 411 (2008) (citation omitted). 
100. Appeal of Russian Orthodox Church of the Holy Ghost, of Ambridge, 
152 A.2d 489, 490 (1959). 
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use . . . .”101 However, the appellant in that case contended that a 
different outcome was appropriate when the owner of the land was 
not a corporation, but instead a religious group, thus making the 
land’s use religious.102 Nevertheless, the court was not convinced 
by this explanation, holding that such an argument “goes too far” 
because the reasoning was based, “not [on] the actual use to be 
made of the land but [on] an extraneous aspect taken on by the 
land depending on the nature of the land’s owner.”103 As such, the 
court held that “a cemetery is basically a secular use of land,” and 
thus, “the fact that the land will be owned by a religious 
institution” does not “alter[] the basic secular use to be made 
thereof.”104 
Similarly, in Mount Elliot Cemetery Ass’n v. City of Troy, a 
cemetery owner brought an action against the city as a result of 
the city’s refusal to rezone the property for use as a Catholic 
cemetery.105 The Sixth Circuit held that the construction of a 
cemetery was secular, and thus “[wa]s not an exercise of religion 
and, therefore, [the owner] [could] not maintain a claim for 
violation of the right to free exercise.”106 In reaching this 
determination, the court relied on the parties’ expert witnesses, 
who had testified that the Church does not consider a Catholic 
cemetery “a fundamental or essential tenet of the religion”107 
because “Catholics can freely exercise their religion whether or not 
they have a Catholic cemetery near them.”108 In finding that the 
“construction and operation of a cemetery [wa]s not an exercise of 
 
101. Id. at 491; see also Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., N.Y. v. 
Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, No. 09 CV 5195 DRH ETB, 2012 WL 1392365, at 
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2012) (finding that a legislative and governing body of 
the Village denied the Roman Catholic Diocese’s cemetery application based 
on its conclusion that the cemetery “was not a religious use of real property, 
but would be a ‘huge commercial operation outside the Village’s framework’”). 
102. Appeal of Russian Orthodox Church of the Holy Ghost, of Ambridge, 
152 A.2d at 491. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. 171 F.3d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 1999). 
106. Id. at 404; see also Calvary Christian Ctr. v. City of Fredericksburg, 
800 F. Supp. 2d 760, 772 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“[C]ourts in several districts have 
held that structures used by religious organizations for secular purposes or 
non-religious activities are not automatically protected as an expression of 
religion.”). 
107. Mount Elliot Cemetery Ass’n, 171 F.3d at 404. 
108. Id. 
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religion,” and that the city’s zoning ordinance was a “neutral law 
of general applicability,” the court upheld the city’s denial of the 
cemetery permit.109 
Recently, in St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of 
Chicago, the Seventh Circuit adjudicated a dispute regarding the 
condemnation of two cemeteries in response to the city’s airport 
expansion proposal.110 The court similarly concluded that “there 
[wa]s nothing inherently religious about cemeteries or graves, and 
the act of relocating them thus [did] not on its face infringe upon a 
religious practice.”111 The court noted that “[s]ome cemeteries are 
affiliated with religious sects, others are not,” and it was 
understandable that out of “natural necessity, for public health 
concerns, after a hurricane or flood, or for many other private or 
public reasons” the town may have to rely on its own discretion in 
making decisions regarding cemeteries.112 
Taking a slightly different path to the same conclusion, the 
court in Stumpf v. Jefferson Parish Council upheld a town’s denial 
of a cemetery permit.113 In reaching its decision, the court 
considered the residents’ perspectives regarding the proposed 
cemetery.114 For instance, the court noted that several residents 
“did not wish to live next to a cemetery and be constantly 
reminded of death each time they went out to get the paper or had 
a backyard barbeque.”115 The court also noted that approximately 
550 residents had signed a petition in opposition of the 
cemetery.116 Lastly, the court voiced its agreement with the town 
councilman’s reasoning that the cemetery would “alter the 
essential character of the area in a manner that was objectionable 
to a large number of people directly affected by the change,” which 
was  why  the  town  councilman  “had  to  side  with  those  of  his 
 
 
 
109. Id. at 405. 
110. 502 F.3d 616, 632 (7th Cir. 2007). 
111. Id. 
112. See id. at 632. But see Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., N.Y. 
v. Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, 128 F. Supp. 3d 566, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(holding that the cemetery denial constituted a prima facie claim for 
substantial burden within the meaning of RLUIPA). 
113. 663 So. 2d 871, 872 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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constituents who would be most immediately impacted by it.”117 
As such, in an effort to honor the local town’s wishes, the court 
upheld the cemetery permit denial.118 
Although, in this instance the court allotted significant weight 
to the constituents’ objections and beliefs, if the cemeteries were 
deemed a religious land use, the disposition would likely have 
come out very differently. As set forth in Church of the Lumumi 
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, if such opposition is just a facade to 
discriminate against a religious exercise, the court would apply 
strict scrutiny.119 However, the court elucidated that “adverse 
impact will not always lead to a finding of impermissible 
targeting.”120 Rather, “a social harm may have been a legitimate 
concern of government for reasons quite apart from 
discrimination.”121 Thus, it is important to distinguish whether 
the activity is classified as a religious activity because this will 
inevitably affect the weight that local opposition would have. 
A recent law review note concluded that a court would likely 
find that a cemetery would constitute a religious land use under 
RLUIPA.122 This conclusion was based on the assumption that 
when courts determine whether a religious accessory is considered 
a religious exercise, “courts commonly look to whether the 
accessory use has ‘a purpose that objective observers generally 
take to be religious in nature.’”123 Based on this presupposition, 
the Note reasoned that because “many cemeteries are openly 
religiously affiliated or feature religious grave markings, it is 
likely that religious cemeteries would pass this objective observer 
test.”124 As such, the Note concluded that “[t]he use of land as a 
religious cemetery would be considered religious exercise because 
the average observer would view the religious cemetery as 
 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. See 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“Although a law targeting religious 
beliefs as such is never permissible, . . . if the object of a law is to infringe 
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not 
neutral, . . . and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and 
is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”). 
120. Id. at 535. 
121. Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
122. Scall, supra note 96, at 119. 
123. Id. (citation omitted). 
124. Id. 
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objectively religious.”125 And so, for this reason, “it would not be 
worthwhile for a municipality to argue its land use regulations 
that specifically apply to cemeteries do not place a substantial 
burden on religious exercise.”126 
Conversely, in light of how the courts have decided this issue, 
there are compelling arguments that support a municipality’s 
position against RLUIPA’s application to cemeteries.127 For 
instance, rather than to rely on the “average observer” test, the 
stronger argument lies in how the courts have viewed cemeteries. 
As discussed above, courts have regarded cemeteries as a secular 
use.128 To base such an important determination on whether an 
average observer might infer that a cemetery is religiously 
affiliated is misguided and arbitrary because it fails to account for 
the intent and purpose of the Act. The entire point of RLUIPA  
was to ensure that religious practices were protected. Thus, in 
deciding whether a cemetery is an actual religious exercise for 
which protection is warranted, the test should not be whether the 
average observer thinks the lot of land is for religious exercise. 
Instead, the test should be focused on whether the religious entity 
relies on the land as a fundamental tenet of its ability to practice 
religion. 
United States v. Seeger provides helpful guidance on how the 
courts have subjectively made these types  of determinations.129  
In Seeger, the court examined the contours of the Universal 
Military Training and Service Act, which exempted individuals 
from the armed services who, by reason of their religious beliefs, 
were conscientiously opposed to participation in the war.130  In 
this case, an individual was denied exemption from the armed 
forces because his beliefs were not in a Supreme Being, but 
instead, were purely ethical.131 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
rejected this narrow exemption and clarified that an individual 
does not need to hold beliefs in relation to a “Supreme Being” to 
 
 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. See supra, Section III.A. 
128. See, e.g., Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & 
Zoning Comm’n of Newtown, 285 Conn. 381, 411 (2008). 
129. See 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
130. Id. at 164–65. 
131. Id. at 166. 
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receive the exemption.132  Rather, the court explained that the  
test should instead focus on “[a] sincere and meaningful belief 
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that 
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the 
exemption.”133 In making exemptions contingent upon an 
individual’s sincerely held beliefs, this raises the issue as to how 
we determine the validity of such declarations. Nevertheless, 
United States v. Ballard has clarified that a jury cannot determine 
whether a particular religious belief is true.134 Rather, a jury can 
only look at the facts to determine whether the viewpoints 
sincerely occupy a place in the plaintiff’s religious beliefs.135 
Nevertheless, making exemptions contingent upon an 
individual’s sincerely held beliefs, rather than the primary pillars 
of a sect as a whole, creates a slippery slope, making it difficult to 
draw a line. The strictly held belief test, however, is more 
favorable than a mere “objective observer test” because the former 
requires an actual showing that a particular practice is a sincerely 
held religious belief, and if need be, provides a jury the 
opportunity to consider additional evidence to ensure that such 
assertions are true. 
Nevertheless, this raises a question as to whether a religious 
group should receive exemptions from local ordinances to 
construct a cemetery for its members, under the presumption that 
a proper burial is a necessary tenet of its members’ religious 
beliefs. The courts emphasized the significance of determining 
whether a belief occupies a meaningful and sincere place in the 
individual.136 Thus, it appears misplaced for a religious group to 
determine that having a cemetery is a central belief held by all 
members. Rather, individual members individually should 
corroborate that a cemetery burial is a sincerely held religious 
belief that he or she holds. This position is presented in reference 
to the courts’ decision to grant religious exceptions on an 
individual, subjective basis. To reach a fair balance, this begs the 
 
132.    Id. at 187. 
133.    Id. at 176. 
134. 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944) (concluding that the District Court correctly 
“withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the 
religious beliefs or doctrines of respondents”). 
135. Id. at 81–82. 
136. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. 
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question: Is there a mechanism by which exemptions can be 
sought on a more individualistic basis? Answering this question 
may better decipher whether land is being used as a fundamental 
tenet of one’s religious beliefs. 
Nonetheless, not all courts are convinced that just because a 
religious entity uses a plot of land, this use is automatically 
deemed a religious exercise. Rather, there must be some showing 
that the land will be used for religious exercise, and that such 
exercise is a fundamental tenet of the faith. In accordance with 
this standard, the plaintiffs themselves are in a better position to 
attest to their sincerity, rather than an average observer. For this 
reason, the courts should focus on whether cemeteries constitute a 
sincerely held religious belief.137 Lastly, given the case law and 
precedent, a municipality need not simply surrender in the face of 
RLUIPA’s overarching definition. A municipality should instead 
challenge the assumption that a cemetery automatically 
constitutes a religious exercise. 
B. Cemetery Regulations are Justified by Compelling Interests 
A cemetery is defined as an area of ground in which dead 
bodies are buried.138 The term cemetery traces its roots from the 
Greek word koimeterion, which means, “sleeping place [or] 
dormitory.”139 Given that cemeteries serve as places to house the 
dead, they present unique challenges that other land uses do not. 
For instance, the negative connotations and critical health 
concerns that cemeteries raise warrant greater consideration than 
other land uses might typically require. In light of these unique 
characteristics, depending on a cemetery’s placement, it may be so 
injurious to the public health that it is rendered a public 
nuisance.140 Alternatively, the cemetery may “be so located and 
arranged, so planted with trees and flowering shrubs, intersected 
 
137. See id. at 165–66 (“We believe that under this construction, the test 
of belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme Being’ is whether a given belief that is 
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor . . . .”). 
138. Cemetery, CAMBRIDGE ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY & 
THESAURUS, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
dictionary/english/cemetery (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
139. Cemetery, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://etymonline.com/ 
index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=cemetery (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
140. R.P. Davis, Annotation, Cemetery or burial ground as nuisance, 50 
A.L.R.2d 1324, § 3 (1956). 
 2018] REGULATING CEMETERIES 319 
 
with drives and walks, and decorated with monumental marbles, 
as to be not less beautiful than a public landscaped garden, and 
free from all reasonable objection.”141 
In light of the special circumstances posed by cemeteries, 
courts tend to tread lightly in this context. Courts have upheld a 
municipality’s prohibition of a cemetery, so long as the decision 
was not “arbitrary and capricious, unreasonable, discriminatory, 
or otherwise unconstitutional.”142 Nevertheless, it is evident that, 
contrary to RLUIPA’s broadly sweeping regulation, there are 
many unique factors involved in the decision to permit a cemetery. 
Therefore, rather than apply a stringent rule, it is more 
appropriate to leave this decision to the discretion of local 
governments.143 
1. Unique Challenges Posed by Cemeteries 
Unlike playgrounds or schools, which are commonly 
associated with youthfulness and laughter, cemeteries are 
commonly associated with death and mourning. As  such, 
although cemeteries may be essential, “they are hardly an 
unqualified benefit to a neighborhood.”144 Rather,  “the  
ceremonies of burial tend to cast gloom over an otherwise cheerful 
and attractive neighborhood.”145 For this reason, the Supreme 
Court of Florida held that it was unfair to enable the defendant to 
use the land at issue for a cemetery because the presence of the 
cemetery would serve as a constant reminder of death and would 
lead to “the depression of the mind.”146 The court reasoned that 
“[the plaintiffs] did not buy [their homes] with the expectation of 
 
141. Id. § 2. 
142. 3 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, CEMETERIES, IN AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 
§ 18:19 (5th ed. 2008) (last updated May 2017). See, e.g., Shumaker v. 
Borough of Dalton, 51 F.2d 793 (M.D. Pa. 1931) (upholding an ordinance that 
prohibited burials within certain areas of the borough against claims that it 
violated due process, equal protection, and the Contract Clause); Picha v. 
County of McLeod, 634 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (overturning the 
county’s denial of cemetery permit because the record contained no evidence 
supporting the county’s decision). 
143. Davis, supra note 140, § 2 (“[A] cemetery is not a nuisance per se, the 
question of whether or not it is a nuisance being one of fact to be determined 
by the circumstances of each case.”). 
144. SALKIN, supra note 142. 
145. Id. 
146. Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 1954). 
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living forever in the gloomy shadow of death, and with the 
disquieting interruptions of their normal pastimes and peaceful 
pursuits occasioned by constantly recurring funeral services.”147 
Furthermore, unlike a park or a building, cemeteries serve as 
places for bodies to decompose. This necessarily presents inherent 
health concerns. For this reason, “[c]lear proof that a cemetery is 
so situated that burial of the dead, there will endanger health and 
life by corrupting the surrounding atmosphere or water, wells or 
springs establishes that it is a nuisance in fact.”148 For instance, 
the United States Supreme Court upheld the Supreme Court of 
California’s holding that it was not unconstitutional to deny a 
cemetery permit due to concerns about contaminated ground- 
water, because “‘the burial of the dead within the City and County 
of San Francisco [wa]s dangerous to life and detrimental to the 
public health.’”149 Similarly, in McCaw v. Harrison, the Court of 
Appeals of Kentucky held that “if the location or maintenance of a 
cemetery endangers the public health, either by corrupting the 
surrounding atmosphere, or water of wells or springs, it 
constitutes a nuisance.”150 
In light of these holdings, it is important to consider that not 
all religions and cultures perform the same burial practices. 
Traditionally, the funeral industry in America has used a burial 
method that consists of embalming the body and then placing it in 
a casket and a concrete vault beneath the ground.151 However, 
recently, there has been a substantial interest in “green 
burials.”152 A green burial is a natural burial method that is 
aimed towards creating a more natural disposal of the body with 
fewer impacts on the environment.153 Thus, a green burial means 
 
147. Id. 
148. 7 MCQUILLIN, Cemetery as nuisance, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations § 24:270 (3d ed.) (last updated July 2017). 
149. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 
363 (1910). 
150. 259 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky. 1953). 
151. Tasnim Shamma, Options for Green Burials on the Rise, NEWSWEEK 
(Aug. 26, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/options-green-burials- 
rise-71717. 
152. Id. 
153. Issues to Consider in Preparing for Disposition of Decedents, 
MASS.GOV HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/ 
departments/dph/programs/environmental-health/comm-sanitation/burial- 
and-cremation.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
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that there is no embalming, no metal, no hard wood for a casket, 
and no vault.154 Although green burials have experienced  a  
recent uptick in the United States, certain religions have 
traditionally required green burials, which has been a main source 
of the opposition surrounding cemetery proposals.155 Nonetheless, 
green burial practices, although accepted by some members of 
society, have not received unanimous support. Rather, many 
communities have raised concerns that depending on the water 
level or presence of wetlands, green burials may cause hazardous 
materials to enter into the water.156 
2. Given cemeteries’ unique characteristics, additional factors 
should be deemed “compelling interests” 
Recall RLUIPA’s requirement that for a government to 
implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a 
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, assembly, 
or institution, the government must demonstrate that the 
imposition of the burden is in the furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest.157 Thus, it is imperative to  determine 
what exactly constitutes a “compelling interest” in light of this 
Act. In the only Supreme Court decision that has addressed the 
constitutionality of RLUIPA, the Supreme Court in Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, analyzing the prisoner provision, emphasized that, in 
regards to the compelling governmental interest standard, courts 
must consider the “context” of the regulation.158 As such, within 
the context of cemeteries, as discussed above, a number of unique 
governmental interests arise. Thus, when considering cemetery 
proposals, the courts should grant local governments greater 
deference and find that these governmental interests constitute 
“compelling interests.” 
To begin, the decomposition of bodies in the ground has the 
potential to release hazardous materials into the ground and 
 
 
154. Id. 
155. Johanna Seltz, Walpole aquifer complicates bid for Muslim cemetery, 
BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 04, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/ 
south/2014/09/03/islamic-burial-service-proposes-build-muslim-cemetery- 
walpole/HMJeC51bEIc4fvYwRhfAPM/story.html. 
156. See id. 
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
158. 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005). 
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water, which presents the risk that water sources and wells may 
become contaminated. For this reason, public health and safety 
interests should constitute a compelling interest under RLUIPA. 
Moreover, such a notion is supported by the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court 
similarly reasoned that “activities of individuals, even when 
religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in 
the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, 
safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the 
exercise of its delegated powers.”159 Because cemeteries pose a 
potential danger to the health and safety of nearby residents, the 
prohibition on their existence by local towns should be a 
compelling government interest that satisfies RLUIPA. 
Further, the presence of a cemetery will presumably lead to 
increased traffic and a greater demand for parking, and noise 
pollution, all of which should constitute a compelling interest. 
New York courts have agreed, stating that “easing traffic 
congestion on an important city avenue . . . is a compelling 
government interest.”160 Moreover, as the Court of Appeals of  
New York noted, a zoning ordinance “may be conditioned on the 
effect the use would have on traffic congestion, property values, 
municipal services, the general plan for development of the 
community, etc.”161 In light of the affects that particular land  
uses might pose, the court reasoned that “[a] community . . . 
should not be obliged to stand helpless in the face of proposed uses 
that are dangerous to the surrounding area.”162 Rather, increased 
“traffic and similar problems . . . are unquestionably within the 
municipality’s police power to exclude  altogether.”163  
Importantly, “the fact that the case reports do not reveal any case 
in which a court has found traffic concerns compelling does not 
 
 
159. 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
160. Int’l Action Ctr. v. City of New York, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93387, at 
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2006); see also Krafchow v. Town of Woodstock, 62 F. 
Supp. 2d 698, 710 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that “the Town’s interest in 
controlling traffic while ensuring the convenience of Town residents is a 
sufficiently compelling interest”); Cole v. Roadway Express, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 
2d 350, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that “the public has a compelling 
interest in maintaining safe roadways”). 
161. Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 596 (1986). 
162. Id. at 595. 
163. Id. 
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support the proposition that traffic concerns by nature cannot be 
compelling.”164 
Additionally, given the impact that a cemetery will have in 
terms of its melancholy presence, increased traffic, and noise 
pollution, zoning regulations should be deemed compelling 
interests. The sudden presence of a cemetery in a town has the 
potential to pose significant changes within the community, which 
is why historical or cultural preservation ordinances, as well as 
the rustic, rural, or residential character of a neighborhood should 
be considered. Accordingly, the cases above touched upon 
constituents’ perspectives regarding the sudden presence of a 
cemetery near their homes, as did most of the news stories 
reporting on the opposition to cemeteries. Reading these stories,  
it is evident that often, the townspeople simply do not want the 
atmosphere of their home to change.165 As a property owner in 
Dudley, Massachusetts, explained: “I grew up here. It’s farmland, 
and I’d like to see it stay that way . . . . A lot of people moved here 
because it’s peaceful and quiet. I just don’t want a cemetery here, 
period. Any kind of cemetery. It doesn’t matter what kind.”166 
However, despite the concerns that are often raised by 
homeowners, the courts consistently refused to regard purely 
aesthetic preferences as compelling interests.167 Yet, that is 
changing. Recently, in light of a RLUIPA challenge, the Seventh 
Circuit held that “[t]he [c]ounty had a compelling interest in 
preserving the rural and rustic character of the Town as well as 
the single-family development around [the] [l]ake.”168 Thus, 
onerous aesthetic effects caused by cemeteries should constitute 
 
164. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 191 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
165. Plans for Muslim cemeteries across US met with worry, 
disappointment, supra note 20. 
166. Id. 
167. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 
554 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
168. Eagle Cove Camp & Conf. Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodboro, 734 F.3d 
673, 682 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr. v. 
Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, 128 F. Supp. 3d 566, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“Defendants ha[d] a legitimate governmental purpose in maintaining the 
integrity of its zoning scheme and the residential character of the Village. It 
[wa]s well-established that States and cities may enact land-use restrictions 
or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and 
desirable aesthetic features of a city.”). 
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compelling interests. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that RLUIPA’s broad definition of 
religious exercise failed to account for the inherent intricacies 
posed by particular land uses, such as cemeteries.169 Thus, in 
failing to enable local government to exercise their discretion over 
such matters, RLUIPA instead has given broad protections to 
religious entities in land use matters.170 This is concerning 
because, as exemplified by cemeteries, particular land uses may 
pose unique challenges and concerns. These unique concerns are 
why religious organizations should not have priority over such 
important land use decisions. Moreover, given that RLUIPA 
requires local government to prove a compelling interest, and that 
such regulations be enforced according to the least restrictive 
means, such a stringent stronghold over the local government 
prevents local officials from exercising their discretion over these 
decisions. The implications that RLUIPA poses are alarming; the 
broad definition of “religious exercise” when put into action has 
proven deficient, and the misbalance of power between religious 
organizations and local governments is distressingly misguided. 
Lastly, it is important to recognize the large divide that 
continues to exist over the matters raised herein. Recall the 
examples provided at the beginning of this Comment, which 
discussed recent cemetery disputes throughout the country.171 
Thus, although the case law and precedent relied upon in this 
Comment strongly supports a finding that cemeteries are not 
religious land uses and are justified by compelling interests, these 
issues have not been laid to rest. Rather, as highlighted above, 
while some courts have rendered more favorable decisions over 
these claims, others, presumably due to RLUIPA, have not.  To 
the extent that cemetery proposals remain contested, claimants 
 
 
169. Furthermore, it is worth noting that cemeteries will necessarily lead 
to increased costs for the town due to the need to finance increased police 
presence and other security measures, as well as, maintenance costs. 
170. See S. Hrg. 106–689, supra note 43, at 109 (prepared statement of 
Chai R. Feldblum Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center) 
(noting that, “one might expect amicus curia briefs from . . . environmental 
groups challenging the notion that it is in the ‘general welfare,’ to pass a 
broad-based rule requiring that any governmental action taken to protect 
[its] interests . . . when any religious belief is burdened by that governmental 
action”). 
171. See supra, Introduction Section. 
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continue to bring their grievances to court, which resultantly, 
largely consumes an opposing communities’ resources and time. 
As such, despite a town’s ability to present a strong defense, to 
even reach this point, the town must expend its limited time and 
resources defending itself. Nonetheless, as matters regarding 
cemetery ordinances remain largely unsettled, it is evident that a 
fair ground needs to be reached. 
IV. THE PROPER RESOLUTION 
Although RLUIPA in its current application poses significant 
shortcomings, there are other alternatives that if adopted, would 
preserve the Act’s goal of preventing discriminatory land use 
regulations while still honoring the states’ power and maintaining 
a fair balance amongst society. 
First, RLUIPA should be repealed. Rather than the federal 
government, the state and local governments should single- 
handedly regulate religious land use. Looking to state statutes, it 
is clear that there already are mechanisms in place to prevent 
against  discriminatory  land  use  regulations.172 For example, 
according to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 40A section 3, 
“[n]o zoning ordinance or by-law shall regulate or restrict . . . the 
use of land or structures for religious purposes or for educational 
purposes on land owned or leased by the commonwealth or any of 
its agencies, subdivisions or bodies politic or by a religious sect or 
denomination.”173 Similar statutes exist in other states as well.174 
Moreover, within the states, both the local governments and 
courts should rely on Smith for guidance and similarly adopt the 
stance that, so long as a law is neutrally applied and of “general 
applicability,” the state does not need to establish a “compelling 
governmental interest” if the regulation imposes a restriction on 
 
 
172. See Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 43, at 337–38 
(“Every state applies at least some elements of its land use law to religious 
landowners, whether it is zoning or use restrictions, or both. Some states are 
more accommodationist than others, for example, Massachusetts gives 
churches the right to choose their zoning and location.”). 
173. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 3 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 74 of 
the 2017 1st Annual Sess.). 
174. See Federalism and the Public Good, supra note 43, at 338; see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. I (by incorporation, all the states must adhere to the 
First Amendment). 
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the intended land use.175 By adopting this approach, land use 
regulations would be applied and investigated neutrally through 
the same lenses, rather than providing stronger lenses for 
religious uses individually. Thus, there would not be any special 
protections afforded to religious organizations, rather, all 
individuals would be required to equally abide by the same 
neutral laws of general applicability. 
If Congress and the judiciary refuse to release the stronghold 
that the federal government currently has over the states 
regarding land use, RLUIPA should be amended to require states 
to create administrative bodies to decide these questions. A local 
state agency could then evaluate every claim on a case-by-case 
basis and would be more in touch with the nature of the 
communities and governmental interests.176 Given that “religious 
land use” has transformed into a wide range of uses, such as 
churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, meditation centers, 
religious centers, religious schools, religious programming, among 
others, the creation of an agency in each state would improve the 
efficiency and validity of resolving these cases.  Furthermore, 
given the compelling needs of local governments, religious entities, 
and the complexities and sensitivities regarding religious land 
matters, the implementation of local administrative bodies, 
ideally, would lead to impartial resolutions. 
Emulating the Massachusetts medical tribunals, a last 
suggestion would be to require any religious land use claims, just 
like medical malpractice claims in Massachusetts, to go before a 
tribunal to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
process the claim.177 In Massachusetts, non-patient medical 
malpractice claims must first go before the Massachusetts medical 
 
175. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), 
superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488. 
176. See Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n of Newtown, 285 Conn. 381, 416 (2008) (citation omitted) (stating, 
“in the land use context, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have rejected a per se approach and instead apply a fact-specific inquiry to 
determine whether the regulation at issue was motivated by discriminatory 
animus”). 
177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West, Westlaw through Ch. 74 
of the 2017 1st Annual Sess.); see also Medical Malpractice Tribunal, MASS. 
MED. SOC’Y, http://www.massmed.org/tribunal/#.WJzgohREbww (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2017). 
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malpractice tribunal.178 The role of the medical tribunal is to 
review the claim to determine whether medical malpractice 
potentially caused the injury or if the injury was merely the result 
of an unfortunate medical result.179 With religious land use cases, 
the tribunal would ideally consist of a judge, a land use attorney, a 
zoning specialist, a town official not from the town at issue, and a 
religious affiliate not involved in the case. After reviewing all the 
evidence and conducting a hearing, if the plaintiff is unable to 
show a likelihood of success on the merits, the plaintiff will have 
to post bond for the case to be litigated.180 As such, it is  
imperative that a hearing before a tribunal is held, so that the 
tribunal can fairly balance the equities of both party’s interests.181 
Tribunals are suggested because they provide an opportunity for 
both the towns and religious entities to have their cases fully 
heard while also saving the parties time and money. Given that 
local governments and religious institutions do not have abundant 
resources nor an everlasting monetary supply for such land use 
debates, tribunals would be ideal because they would alleviate 
long, arduous trials, thus allowing the parties to spend their 
limited time and resources on their communities. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues that RLUIPA poses need to be publicized in order 
to shed light on the harrowing implications that RLUIPA has, not 
only upon our legal foundations, but also, upon all our local 
communities. Nationwide, there has been an influx of cases in 
which local municipalities have been pressed to grant requests for 
various places of worship ranging from churches, synagogues, 
mosques, temples, religious schools, religious community centers, 
and even cemeteries. Nevertheless, with this sudden increase in 
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181. H.R. 1691 Hearing, supra note 51, at 147 (statement of Marci 
Hamilton, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law) (stating, 
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demand this has also led to an increase in investigations 
conducted by the Federal Justice Department against the local 
municipalities. As a result, this Act has in effect completely 
discarded a municipality’s power to have any input in the land use 
proposals for their community. 
Nonetheless, this Comment is not intended to condone local 
biases or discrimination, which is simply unconstitutional.  
Rather, this Comment is intended to call into question the need 
for RLUIPA’s regulation, which has ultimately decided that 
religious entities deserve greater power and protection than do 
local government and nonreligious individuals. Our nation prides 
itself on its diversification and acceptance, but with our 
continuous diversification comes with it the competing interests 
and demands of different cultural and religious institutions. 
Alternatively, what this Act disregards is that our available land 
is not increasing, but is in fact, limited. For this reason, local 
communities still need to have an input in decisions regarding 
land use so that the needs of all individuals are met. Due 
consideration needs to be given to the fact that for some 
individuals, what they cherish most is not religion, but rather, 
their towns historical charm or fruitful farmland. Most 
importantly, as highlighted above, the application of RLUIPA’s 
wide-reaching land use provision has proven problematic, as 
showcased by the cemetery example. Nevertheless, there  are 
other alternatives that the federal and local governments could 
adopt, thus fulfilling the needs of both the municipalities and 
religious entities in a fair and balanced way. 
